Back in 2020 a reader wanted me to tackle the Epicurean Paradox, as it’s called. So I did. But I’ve had to update the article a bit.
Epicurus of Athens (Greek Ἐπίκουρος/Epíkuros, 341–270BC) is the founder of “the Garden,” a philosophy school. He’s a materialist, meaning he didn’t bother with spiritual stuff, and didn’t believe the gods intervened in human affairs. He’s also an empiricist, meaning he believed all knowledge comes from what we perceive with our five senses—not intuition, not rationalization; ideally you wanna go with the scientific method, but that wasn’t invented yet.
Epicurus believed the purpose of philosophy is to promote peace and tranquility, and alleviate suffering. Over the centuries “epicurean” evolved into a synonym for “foodie,” which is weird ’cause Epicurus preferred simple meals. He wrote more than 300 works on all sorts of subjects, but we only have three books and various random quotes. The Epicurean Paradox is one of those quotes.
And for all we know, Epicurus didn’t even come up with it. The paradox was a popular ancient meme, and wound up with Epicurus’s name attached to it, much like the Prayer of St. Francis. I wouldn’t be at all surprised if it predates Epicurus; somebody had to have thought of it before him. In any event Christian philosopher Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius (ca. 250–325) quotes the paradox in his book De ira Dei/“On God’s Wrath,” in which he critiqued the non-foodie Epicureans of his day. My translation:
[Epicurus] said God either wants to eliminate evil and can’t; or can, but doesn’t want to; or neither can nor wants to; or can and wants to. If he wants to and can’t, he’s weak—which fails to describe God. If he can but doesn’t want to, he’s jealous—which is equally alien to God. If he neither can nor wants to, he’s jealous and weak—therefore not God. If he can and wants to, which is the only proper conclusion… God, where are you? Lactantius 13.20-21
It’s obviously not an exact quote of Epicurus, ’cause as a polytheist he’d’ve referred to the gods, not God. Anyway, the gist of it worked its way down to Scottish philosopher David Hume, who put it this way in his 1779 book Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion—placed in the mouth of his character Philo.
Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? Hume 10
Clearly Hume never read the source of the Epicurean Paradox, ’cause Lactantius actually does answer the old question. Which I’m now gonna quote from the Ante-Nicene Fathers translation, “A Treatise on the Anger of God Addressed to Donatus,” ’cause I don’t feel like translating the whole of it.
For God is able to do whatever he wishes, and there is no weakness or envy in God. He is able, therefore, to take away evils; but he does not wish to do so, and yet he is not on that account envious. For on this account he does not take them away, because he at the same time gives wisdom, as I have shown; and there is more of goodness and pleasure in wisdom than of annoyance in evils. For wisdom causes us even to know God, and by that knowledge to attain to immortality, which is the chief good. Therefore, unless we first know evil, we shall be unable to know good. But Epicurus did not see this, nor did any other, that if evils are taken away, wisdom is in like manner taken away; and that no traces of virtue remain in man, the nature of which consists in enduring and overcoming the bitterness of evils. And thus, for the sake of a slight gain in the taking away of evils, we should be deprived of a good, which is very great, and true, and peculiar to us. It is plain, therefore, that all things are proposed for the sake of man, as well evils as also goods. Lactantius 13
For Lactantius, God can but doesn’t want to—not because he’s evil, but because he’s gonna teach us to fight evil alongside him, and that’s good.
I like Lactantius’s answer. It’s not my answer, but it’s a darned good one. But it’s an answer which clearly won’t work at all for nontheists like Hume. Really, such people use these arguments to prove there’s no God in the first place, and any answer to the problem of evil and pain which involves God is unacceptable. I don’t know that Epicurus was nontheist, but as a materialist he didn’t figure a relationship with the gods was even possible, so it wouldn’t’ve worked for him either.
Let’s not forget those pagans who don’t even want such a relationship with God. They wanna believe in him, and maybe interact with him if he makes ’em feel good, but they don’t care to follow him all that much. Really they just want evil and suffering to stop already. And definitely don’t wanna be recruited into the battle to fight it; isn’t that God’s job?